Without getting published or finding my voice and ability to speak to others at conferences, I would have most likely never started an online education platform on YouTube or anywhere else. So thank you to the professors at the philosophy department who encouraged us all to always submit abstracts to journals or conferences\u2014and especially for teaching us about how to ask for money for such things from departments, colleges, and student government. It honestly felt like cheating when I learned about research travel grants.<\/em><\/p> A final note on the following essay: This work is fundamental to all my thinking because it was how I learned to use conceptual frameworks to bring together different thinkers to generate new ways of thinking about technology and media. When I wrote this, I considered it a work of \u201cphilosophy of technology,\u201d which is not incorrect. However, \u201ccritical media theory\u201d better describes what this work is doing. Philosophy of science or technology are both necessary elements of critical media theory, but, as Heidegger says at the beginning of his Question Concerning Technology, the goal is \u201cto bring us into a freer relationship with technology.\u201d Because technology conditions the background of all we perceive and do, it is hard to gain the critical distance necessary to think about it in ways not already over-simplified and banal.<\/em><\/p> \u201cMedia\u201d in the sense used in the term \u201ccritical media theory\u201d does not signify The Media, as used to mean the news networks. Instead, \u201cmedia\u201d is used Marshall McLuhan\u2019s way in The Medium Is The Message or Understanding Media. Media are technologies for extending or refining our ability to perceive reality; moreover, when you hear \u201cmedia\u201d you should think of the word \u201cmediate\u201d because any technology that is technically media mediates your present perception by re-presenting to consciousness that which is not otherwise immediately present. Media represents reality. This definition of media includes the written word, which is the medium of representation par excellence.<\/em><\/p> Video, radio or podcasts, and social media are all also forms of media that mediate and re-present what gets taken to be reality to consciousness. Insofar as one uses philosophers of social reality to theorize and critically analyze the ways the human condition is impacted by technological developments in media, one can be said to be doing critical media theory. Therefore, this essay that follows is my first published work in critical media theory.<\/em><\/p> I hope there will be many to follow as I develop the conceptual means and methodology necessary for doing this kind of work because it is more important now than almost anything else.<\/em><\/p> In case I die before getting around to it, I someday hope to write a work that will argue the foundational thinkers to critical media theory are Marx, Heidegger, McLuhan, and Arendt\u2014usually only McLuhan gets mentioned out of this list of names but, I claim, he is as important (not more important) as Marx, Heidegger, and Arendt, who should all be read as foundational to this emerging field. For now, if you find the idea of critical media theory alluring, start with McLuhan\u2019s <\/em>Understanding Media, Arendt\u2019s <\/em>The Human Condition, and then go to Marx\u2019s \u201cEstranged Labor\u201d and Heidegger\u2019s \u201cThe Question Concerning Technology.\u201d<\/em><\/p> Introduction<\/strong><\/p> \u201cWe will be questioning concerning technology.\u201d<\/p> \u2013 Martin Heidegger<\/p> Average everyday life in developed 21st-century countries is essentially technological. Ren\u00e9 Descartes\u2019s vision for an \u201cinfinity of devices\u201d enabling a \u201ctrouble-free enjoyment\u201d of all the earth\u2019s goods has been realized: our devices and applications offer a world of utility, convenience, and entertainment.2<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Yet new dangers accompany otherwise seemingly positive developments. Taking Martin Heidegger\u2019s analysis of the essence of technology as \u201cenframing\u201d for our point of departure, this paper will examine some of these dangers so as to bring us into a freer relationship with technology, ourselves, and one another.<\/p> The distraction and escape made possible by our devices, what Sherry Turkle calls \u201cfriction-free living,\u201d is a danger to the interdependent possibilities of authenticity and ethical living. Her conception of \u201cthe virtuous circle\u201d will be used to begin bringing Heidegger and Levinas, the philosophers of authenticity and the Other, respectively, into a constructive dialogue about timeless issues that are only becoming more timely within the sway of enframing.3<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p> Part I introduces Heidegger\u2019s conception of the essence of technology and then his view of authenticity. For Heidegger, the call of conscience is one\u2019s ownmost possibility: death. Part II brings in Levinas\u2019s response, arguing that the call of conscience is instead ethical, instigated by \u201cthe face\u201d of the Other. At this point, we will have two phenomenological views of conscience: responsibility to be true to oneself vs. responsibility to the Other. Part III will then bring Heidegger and Levinas face to face for a complimentary dialogue via Turkle\u2019s conception of the \u201cvirtuous circle,\u201d which is the reciprocally dependent interplay between solitude and solicitude.4<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p> I. Technology, Falling, and Authenticity<\/strong><\/p> Our average everyday technological disposition, what Martin Heidegger conceives of as \u201cenframing,\u201d reduces the earth to base material resources to be exploited, challenged forth and put on call as \u201cstanding reserve\u201d (Bestand). As both the essence of technology and the spirit of our age, enframing casts a totalizing grid over the world, within which entities are fractured into elements for human appropriation. Uprooted and displaced from their meaningful places and times, things are uniformly rendered calculable and exchangeable, their value ascribed by the standards of usefulness and money, the measures of power and profit. The earth is thereby reduced to a conglomeration of resources to be extracted, expedited, and exposed as to produce \u201cthe maximum yield at the minimum expense.\u201d5<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Anything failing to fulfill a function within this self-referential grid of serviceability is rendered obsolete or meaningless. Although this situation gives rise to the illusion that we have become \u201cmasters and possessors of nature,\u201d Heidegger shows how these hubristic and imperialistic delusions backfire.<\/p> \u201cDasein\u201d is the subject of Heidegger\u2019s analysis in Being and Time<\/em>. This is the (human) kind of being that is inextricably absorbed within a world of care and involvements. Dasein lives always thrown within a referential totality of language, things, equipment, and other dasein. Because dasein is inextricably being-in-the-world, enframing the world means that dasein is also enframed. Just as things in the world are put on call as means for the fulfillment of our ends, within the sway of enframing we ourselves are reduced to calculable and exchangeable \u201chuman resources.\u201d6<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Much has already been written about the negative effects of enframing on Earth\u2019s ecology. Instead, we will examine the effects of enframing on personal growth and social living and the problems thereby posed for living an authentic or ethical life.<\/p> No one, in Heidegger\u2019s account, can ever fully achieve authenticity. Dasein is thrown into the world, \u201cfalling\u201d and immersed in Theyness\u2014the averaged understanding of a given public. Theyness provides dasein with a world of universalized, ready-made possibilities and attainable, though superficial, knowledge. Heidegger characterizes falling as a threefold, reciprocal, interdependent cyclical process consisting of three phenomena: ambiguity, curiosity, and idle talk. These are technical terms, not to be confused with their typical connotations.<\/p> By \u201ccuriosity\u201d Heidegger means a superficial and non-committal pursuit of novelty and endless stimulation.7<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Antithetical to being present, to belonging or dwelling, \u201ccuriosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction\u201d8<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> (original emphasis). Driven by the uncanniness and unease of anxiety,9<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> curiosity propels dasein from one thing to the next, never allowing the commitment required to gain true understanding that requires dedication and perseverance. \u201cIdle talk\u201d is the day-to-day chatter and non-committal sharing of information that is a necessary feature of our lives. As the quick passing along of information occurs, we become so inundated by information that we are naturally discouraged from deepening our understanding, thus losing a sense of what really matters.10<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Having no real stake in these conversations, one can pass information along regardless of its truth or relevancy, without taking responsibility for what is said.<\/p> The result of curiosity and idle talk is ambiguity. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy adeptly defines ambiguity as \u201ca loss of any sensitivity to the distinction between genuine understanding and superficial chatter.\u201d11<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Without first practicing the courage, humility, and patience required for genuine discourse, we lose the deeper senses of meaning, understanding, and belonging that allow us to distinguish between what is genuine and what is not. The diminishment of this ability, and the difficulty of its recovery, discourages commitment, thus habituating us to lives of detachment or ironic posturing. This decrease in genuine conversations therefore blurs one\u2019s ability to tell the trivial from the essential.<\/p> According to Heidegger\u2019s analysis, this vicious cycle\u2014sustained by the interplay between ambiguity, curiosity, and idle talk\u2014has us freewheeling, lost in the undifferentiated space of inauthenticity. Every human is thrown into the culture of his or her birth. Pre-given notions for how to go about comporting ourselves guide us as we are raised. Thus, Heidegger says, certain universalized possibilities have been set before us to the exclusion of those more relevant to our particular situations. Each and every one of these pre-defined possibilities is itself modeled after what-has-been-actual alone, rather than on the full scope of what is possible for one\u2019s unique place in history. Because the universalized possibilities have been made by and for the aggregated masses, no dasein can discover its \u201cownmost possibilities\u201d12<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> when lost in the vicious cycle. The turbulence levels qualitative distinctions and reduces every other to the same One (das Man). We thus implicitly compare ourselves and others to an elusive and universalized abstraction that eclipses our particular possibilities.<\/p> It will be argued (via Turkle) that the vicious cycle Heidegger characterizes as falling is only exacerbated by technological media in our age of enframing. However, we will first turn from the subject of authenticity (responsibility to self) to that of ethics, as developed by the philosopher of responsibility to the Other par excellence.<\/p> II. Responsibility & the Other<\/strong><\/p> Emmanuel Levinas was deeply influenced by Heidegger\u2019s Being and Time,<\/em> attending his lectures a year after its publication in 1927. However, his admiration quickly soured when Heidegger joined the Nazi party in 1933. With the outbreak of the Second World War, Levinas, a French Jew, returned to France to fight for the allied forces. He was soon captured and spent the remainder of the war in a German P.O.W. camp. After the war, Heidegger never made a public apology for his participation in the party. Some speculate that his refusal to publicly disavow the Nazi party was due to his prioritization of \u201cpersonal authenticity\u201d over the opinions of the public.13<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p> Levinas suspected that Heidegger\u2019s focus on the all-encompassing nature of Being and individual freedom had eclipsed the possibility of his appreciation for the radical alterity14<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> we experience when encountering others. Levinas\u2019s phenomenological project thus turns Heidegger\u2019s on its head. Whereas \u201cthe call of conscience\u201d in Heidegger\u2019s analysis is the individuating force of death anxiety that compels dasein to be true to its \u201cownmost possibilities\u201d in spite of the They, the call of conscience for Levinas is the felt weight of responsibility instigated in the face of the Other15<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> (where we understand \u201cface\u201d to be all human expression). His phenomenology founds everything else on this responsibility, which is why Levinas claims that ethics is first philosophy.<\/p> Levinas argues that our very freedom is conditioned by the Other. A self only emerges in the face of the Other, as it is in this encounter that it is naturally compelled to justify and therefore individuate its self (\u201capology,\u201d in the Greek sense). This being addressed and having to account for itself reifies self-hood in developing self-reflection, character, language, rationality, conscience, and consciousness (which are inextricably entwined for the French, who have only one word for both: conscience). Conscience, therefore, owes its very being to the Other, which beckons it into the light of Being. This beckoning compels, leading to the naturally felt obligation to, on the one hand, justify one\u2019s beliefs or actions to the Other, and also to be hospitable to others just as one desires to feel welcomed by the Other.<\/p> Our desire to be welcomed by the Other, which is no ordinary desire, only increases in proportion to its fulfillment. Levinas terms this \u201cmetaphysical Desire,\u201d which he characterizes in one place as \u201cgenuine discourse.\u201d Totalization renounces genuine discourse.16<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> For the possibility of the fulfillment of metaphysical desire, I must be open to the transcendence of the other that ruptures my totality by calling it into question.17<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p> The responsibility to welcome, critique, and respond to the Other renders us vulnerable and can be exhausting. We therefore tend to retreat into the comforting and secure confines of our own totalized worlds. This act of totalization resembles the appropriative nature of our digestive processes, attempting to subsume that which is other to the same18<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> via knowledge acquisition.<\/p> We can never truly subsume the Other, yet conceptualization instigates the imperial delusion that we can grasp, acquire, and possess knowledge of those who are beyond oneself.19<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> There is a sense in which a concept of a mere thing surrenders said thing to our power. But a concept signifying an actual other person is necessarily deficient and misleading, as it cannot possibly contain that to whom it refers. A signifier cannot contain its signified. The signified other overflows conceptualization.<\/p> Equipped now with both Heidegger\u2019s understanding of authenticity and Levinas\u2019s reversal of focus to that of ethics, I hope to show that these two accounts can find mutually illuminating accord within Turkle\u2019s portrayal of \u201cthe virtuous circle.\u201d By doing so, I hope to show that neither philosopher\u2019s phenomenology of conscience need be rejected for the sake of the other. Instead, both of their projects develop a richer understanding if seen as two interdependent facets of our lived experience.<\/p> III. The Virtuous Circle<\/strong><\/p> \u201cLanguage \u2026 has created the word \u2018loneliness\u2019 to express the pain of being alone.<\/p> And it has created the word \u2018solitude\u2019 to express the glory of being alone.\u201d<\/p> \u2013 Paul Tillich<\/p> In her 2015 bestseller Reclaiming Conversation<\/em>, sociologist and clinical psychologist Sherry Turkle argues that our trends toward short and sporadic, virtually based media of communication are posing problems for leading both authentic and ethical lives. This is because virtual access to one another and instantaneous entertainment hinders what she calls \u201cthe virtuous circle,\u201d which is the healthy interplay between the interdependent experiences of solitude and genuine solicitude. This framework provides a clearing within which to situate face to face both Heidegger and Levinas, the philosophers of authenticity and the Other, respectively.<\/p> In our age of an \u201cinfinity of devices\u201d and apps, Turkle states that \u201cbeing alone\u201d has become something seen as \u201ca problem technology should solve.\u201d20<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Our phones promise a \u201cfriction free life\u201d wherein we will never be lonely, bored, or unheard. However, learning to get past the angst, boredom, or loneliness experienced when by ourselves undistracted is, according to psychoanalysis, essential to achieving solitude, which is itself fundamental in the development of confidence, imagination, creativity, and empathy. \u201cSolitude reinforces a secure sense of self, and with that, the capacity for empathy.\u201d21<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Stronger empathy leads to forming deeper bonds with others, whose conversations then provide the rich material for self-reflection and imagination. Imagination leads to creativity, while self-reflection builds the self-esteem and empathy needed for quality engagement with others.22<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p> To truly achieve solitude, one must become comfortable with allowing one\u2019s mind to wander, free of distractions.23<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> However, the gadgets we find increasingly saturating our lives are created for the sake of distraction, offering us enframed ways of escape from raw experience.<\/p> When we thereby fail to develop a secure sense of self that is confident\u2014having something to offer others24<\/sup><\/a><\/sup>\u2014we become more likely to project onto others. Thinking with Levinas, we see this increases our tendency to totalize, which he says renounces genuine discourse.25<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p> By habituating ourselves to superficial distractions at the mere onset of boredom, we become more easily bored by anyone or anything not saying or doing exactly what we are immediately interested in. Thus the loneliness or angst felt when alone carries into social situations, which we then attempt to resolve via the same manner of fleeing\u2014our devices. This is how the virtuous circle of solitude and genuine solicitude breaks into a vicious downward spiral.<\/p> Reaching out for genuine connection becomes conflated with reaching out for distraction. We begin implicitly treating one another as resources for escape, literally on call (remember Bestand?). Enframing in this manner, we are likewise challenged forth by others. Now we feel obligated to keep our phones on when in private. This increases the permeability between the boundaries of our public and private spheres, thus further corrupting our possibilities for being fully present when alone or<\/em> with others. Turkle characterizes this as a reversal of the virtuous circle, resulting in a process of alienation and indeterminacy. Because the reciprocal interplay of the virtuous circle is non-linear, \u201creversal\u201d does not seem conceptually appropriate. I propose that this breakdown of the cyclical model be characterized as the formation of a binary opposition between refractory poles:<\/p> We therefore see that our phones are enabling and encouraging fleeing in the face of anxiety into the distractions offered by theyness, thus deafening Heidegger\u2019s call of conscience which compels us to be true to our ownmost possibilities. Consequently, this movement drives us to become more totalizing in our ways, thus renouncing Levinas\u2019s call of conscience instigated by the Other, which closes off our possibilities for the satisfaction of metaphysical desire through genuine discourse. The \u201cfriction free life\u201d made possible by our smart-phones becomes akin to Frodo\u2019s ring, tempting a short-term escape from raw confrontations with our immediate situation.26<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p> As with substance abuse, utilizing a short-term means of escape weakens our ability to cope, lowers resolve, and thereby strengthens addiction. Studies show that our tendency to flee difficult encounters is made easier and more frequent with technology.27<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p> Considering the fact that real conversations often require a little boredom, awkwardness, or the ability to pay attention to what the other is saying, this poses a serious problem. Taking the easy way out (often) cheats us. Levinas would say that what is being diminished by this phenomenon is the twofold act of both welcoming and answering to the transcendence of the other, which is our a priori28<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> obligation and the foundation of ethics. Our tendency to shun responsibility to the Other (totalization) is therefore reified technologically by friction free living.<\/p> Likewise, Heidegger is brought to bear, as taking a resolute stand toward one\u2019s ownmost possibilities brought to light via anxiety is also his key to authenticity.29<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> The harder it becomes to achieve fulfillment in solitude, the more we pursue superficial distractions (curiosity), which breaks down the virtuous circle until we find ourselves living in the difference between. This is where I want to inject Heidegger\u2019s characterization of falling, which we were earlier referring to as \u201cthe vicious cycle.\u201d Having not established a secure center, dasein becomes lost in the universalized possibilities of the They. Thus the two interdependent and complimentary experiences of solitude and solicitude break down into the refractory poles of loneliness with self and loneliness with others. These repellent movements then propel the vicious cycle of ambiguity, curiosity, and idle talk.<\/p> Never fully present, lost spinning in the undertow of the They\u2019s leveling turbulence, we are repelled away by both the transcendence of the Other (real solicitude) and the necessary angst which must be confronted resolutely in order to come face to face with one\u2019s ownmost thrown possibilities. The Other challenges our leveled and superficial totalizations, but we flee into the comforting confines of the They\u2019s understanding that renounces genuine discourse and refuses to welcome critique. Rather than taking a resolute stand to our own thrown possibilities, we are seduced by the distractions and pursuits established by the totalized Other in the form of the They.<\/p> Various proposals for ways to ameliorate these problems have been put forward by the thinkers drawn from throughout this chapter. For the sake of brevity, we will simply conclude by saying that the immediate two-part answer is to take time for poetic dwelling with oneself free of distractions, allowing one\u2019s mind\u2014and feet\u2014to wander outside the possibilities provided by devices, apps, or literal paths and roads. Then, when in public, making a deliberate point to practice being fully present to the transcendence of others, thereby cultivating the possibilities for reclaiming undistracted and genuine conversations. As the old Thai Buddhist proverb goes, \u201cWhen alone, practice right thought. When with others, practice right speech.\u201d Consider this insight in the context of this chapter: When alone, practice resoluteness in the face of anxiety. When with others, practice genuine discourse with the Other.30<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p> 1<\/a> A pronunciation pointer for fellow pleebs: \u201cDue-Cane.\u201d<\/p> 2<\/a> Ren\u00e9 Descartes, Discourse on Method for Conducting One\u2019s Reason Well and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 35.<\/p> 3<\/a> This paper will not try to settle Levinas and Heidegger\u2019s disagreement about the primacy of Being vs. the Other.<\/p> 4<\/a> The version of this essay published in Stance uses the word \u201csociality\u201d instead of solicitude. Ever since its publication I wished I had used \u201csolicitude\u201d instead of \u201csociality.\u201d The issue with using both solitude and solicitude is that these words get used differently depending on the philosopher who might implement them. I mean nothing other than \u201cbeing-with-oneself\u201d for solitude and \u201cbeing-withothers\u201d for solicitude.<\/p> 5<\/a> Martin Heidegger, \u201cThe Question Concerning Technology,\u201d in Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 322.<\/p> 6<\/a> Ibid, 323<\/p> 7<\/a> Heidegger, \u201cQuestion Concerning Technology,\u201d 214.<\/p> 8<\/a> Ibid, 216.<\/p> 9<\/a> Not to be confused with the typical meaning of the word, Heidegger argues that angst is the mood that underlies and defines all the others. Whereas, for Heidegger, fear has a definite object, anxiety has no definitive object. As he says elsewhere, dasein\u2019s very essence \u201cmeans being held out into the nothing.\u201d This sense of impending nothingness is the \u201cbewildered calm\u201d that repels us into our being-in-the-world. \u201cWhat is Metaphysics?\u201d in Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 103.<\/p> 10<\/a> Martin Heidegger, Being and Time<\/em>, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 211.<\/p> 11<\/a> Michael Wheeler, \u201cMartin Heidegger,\u201d in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/archives\/win2016\/entries\/heidegger\/<\/p> 12<\/a> Think of \u201cownmost possibilities\u201d as the possibilities which are unique to oneself specifically because of one\u2019s particular situation. My possibilities are not yours, and if you tried to fill my role, then the possibilities would change. The fact that this basic truism is novel to some people testifies to the pervasiveness of the They.<\/p> 13<\/a> Iain Thomsons portrays the fallout between Marcuse and Heidegger in \u201cFrom the Question Concerning Technology to the Quest for a Democratic Technology,\u201d Inquiry 43, no. 2 (June 2000): 203-15.<\/p> 14<\/a> \u201cAlterity\u201d simply means the otherness of things or people. It is that which is beyond or outside of oneself.<\/p> 15<\/a> \u201cOther\u201d should be understood as the abstract presence of any and all others: past, present, and potential future encounters. The Other is always with us, even when others aren\u2019t. *2021 update: I\u2019ve kept this footnote here because it\u2019s what was published, but actually uppercase O \u201cOther,\u201d for Levinas, means the concrete Other\u2026 the one with whom we have a face-to-face encounter. He uses lowercase \u201cother\u201d as well as \u201calterity\u201d to get at \u201cotherness\u201d though more generally. This is even more confusing due to the fact that Lacan\u2019s uppercase O \u201cOther\u201d is more akin to the social order, not the concrete other.<\/p> 16<\/a> Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority<\/em> (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 42.<\/p> 17<\/a> \u201cMetaphysical desire\u201d is just one of the many weird terms developed and used by Emmanuel Levinas. Basically it is our desire to be with, understand, seen, heard, and understood by others.<\/p> 18<\/a> \u201cSame\u201d is another way of talking about that which is not other than oneself.<\/p> 19<\/a> Levinas, Totality and Infinity<\/em>, 44, 188.<\/p> 20<\/a> Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age<\/em> (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 10.<\/p> 21<\/a> Ibid., 17.<\/p> 22<\/a> Ibid., 25.<\/p> 23<\/a> There is an important possibility for bringing Zhuangzi to bear for which this current rendition does not have time to do justice.<\/p> 24<\/a> Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation, 10.<\/p> 25<\/a> Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 42.<\/p> 26<\/a> Frodo is a character from Lord of the Rings. The ring he bears provides the magical power to disappear\u2014and, it\u2019s important to mention for the sake of this analogy to our devices, use of the ring is highly addictive.<\/p> 27<\/a> Ibid, 34.<\/p> 28<\/a> A priori just means the stuff we can know without empirical research. Levinas\u2019 whole life project advances the argument that moral responsibility is a priori.<\/p>![\"\"](\"https:\/\/theory-underground.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/11\/image-1.png\")
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